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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARY ABRAHAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RUE ABRAHAM & GLORIA ABRAHAM,
husband and wife,
Defendants,

Case No.
10014

GRANT SHAW & ILA MAY SHAW,
husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Appellants, Def.endants in the trial court, have
taken an appeal from a Decree of Foreclosure, ente~ed on
the 24th day of September, 1963 by the Honorable F,erdinand Erickson. The decree granted the Respondent a prior
right to proceeds from the sale of real property in the
amount of $8,506.00 and gave the Appellants any proceeds
over that amount.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court enter,ed a judgment determining
that the Plaintiff below, Respondent here, had a prior mortgage on the real property being sold, which was superior
to the mortgage of the Def,endants, Grant Shaw and Ila
May Shaw, and awarding a total judgment of $8,506.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek to reverse the Decree of Foreclosure on the theory that there was an inadequate consideration to support the first mortgage.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff was granted a mortgage upon r,eal property, which was the subject matter of the foreclosure proceedings. The prop,erty had been originally acquired by
Rue Abraham and Gloria Abraham from Defendants Grant
Shaw and Ila May Shaw. Grant Shaw and Ila May Shaw
entered into a contract in which they agreed to sell the
property involved to Rue Abraham and Gloria Abraham.
One of the terms of the contract was that the property
would be conveyed to Rue Abraham and Gloria Abraham,
and the purchasers would place a first mortgage on the
property for $5,850.00 in favor of Mary J. Abraham. The
agreement described the property involv,ed and also specifically provided that a second mortgage would be granted to
Grant Shaw and Ila May Shaw in the sum of $5,000.00. The
following is the language used in the agr,eement between
the parties :
"As additional security to assur,e the payments on said
real estate contract the second party (Rue Abraham
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and Gloria Abraham) hav.e this day given to the first
party a mortgage of $5,000.00 subject to a previous
mortgage for $5,850.00 in favor of Mary J. Abraham
on the house and .85 of an acre above described, a deed
with abstract on a vacant lot as follows:" (R. 116).
In addition to the agreement of the parties concerning
the priority of the mortgages and the amount of mortgages,
the mortgage of the Plaintiff was recorded prior to the
recordation of the mortgage of the Defendants.
The mortgag.e of Plaintiff was for a present consideration of $350.00 paid at the time the mortgage was granted
and the r.elease of antecedent indebtedness due her in the
sum of $5,500.00. (R. 19).
ARGUMENT
Point No.1
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT REACHED A
CORRECT LEGAL RESULT.

w.e agree with the Appellants that the promissory
note and mortgage granted to the Respondent was for the
consideration of $350.00 cash and the further consideration
of a rel.ease of antecedent indebtedness in the amount of
$5,500.00. The priority of the mortgage granted to theRespondent and the exact amount of the mortgage was the
subject of a contract between the makers of the note and
mortgage and the Appellants, Grant Shaw and Ila May
Shaw. In the agreement executed by them shown at Page
116 of the Record and already reviewed by this court in
the case of Shaw vs. Abraham, 12 Utah 2d 150, 364 P2d 7,
the following language was included after considerable
negotiations:
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"As additional security to assur.e the payments of the
real ,estate contract the s.econd party (makers of the
note and mortgage) has this day given the first party
a mortgage of $5,000.00, subject to a previous mortgage
of $5,850.00 in favor of Mary J. Abraham on the house
and .85 of an acre abov•e described, a deed with abstract
on a vacant lot specified as follows:"
The agreement was pr.epared by Mr. Ben Boyce, a real
estate agent rep:r.esenting the Appellants. He specifically
discussed the matter of priority of mortgages with the
Appellants. On cross examination he testified as follows:
Record Pag;e 321, commencing at Line 9:
Now specifically I am r.eferring to this provision:
'As additional security to insure the payments of said
real estate contract, the s,econd party has this day given
the first party a mortgage of $5,000.00, subject to a
previous mortgage of $5,850.00 in favor of Mary J.
Abraham,' and then it goes on and describes the house
and lot the second mortgage is to be on.
''Q

"A

Y~s.

"Q Now this was discussed with you prior to your
leaving Richfield to go back and prepare the agreements?

"A Yes, sir."

Since the Appellants wer.e parties to a contract determining the priority and the amount of the mortgage to
be granted to Mary J. Abraham, they are not now in a
position to raise these questions.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
Although we are of the opinion that the Appellants
ar·e estopped from raising the question of lack of consideration, we will discuss that defense. The question is not lack
of consideration, but whether the rel·ease of antecedent
indebtedness is suffici.ent consideration to support a promissory note and mortgage. This problem has been r~solved in
Utah both by statute and by decisions of this court. Section
25-1-3, UCA 1953 puts the problem at rest with the following language :
"Fair consideration. Fair consideration is given for
property, or obligation:
(1) When in exchange for such property, or obligation,
as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied; or,
(2) When such property, or obligation, is received in
good faith to s,ecure a present advance or antecedent
debt in amount not disproprotionately small when compared with the value of the property or obligation obtained."
The proof at the trial was conclusive as to the matter
of consideration, and it was that there was an advance of
$350.00 cash and a r.elease of anteoedent indebtedness of
$5,500.00. No evidence' was offered by the Respondent
concerning the matter. It should be noted that the Respondent had the burden of proving by clear and convincing proof that there was no consideration. Section 44-1-25,
UCA 1953 requires a person attacking a promissory note
which is in negotiable form to assume the burden of showing that it was not given for valuable consideration. The
section reads :
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"Presumption of consideration. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for
a valuable consideration, and every person whose signature appears ther.eon, to have become a party thereto
for value."
The Utah case of Hudson vs. Moon, 42 Utah 377, 130
Pac. 77 4, holds that under the section quoted the production
of the note and proof of signature make it prima facie case
of valuable consideration, placing the burden on the Defendants of producing evidence to overcome this presumption.
A further review of the Utah authorities on the question of whether antecedent indebtedness is a valid consideration should be commenced with a review of Section 44-1-26,
UCA 1953, which states:
''Consideration, what constitutes. Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An
antecedent or pre-.existing debt constitutes value and
is deemed such, whether the instrument is payable on
demand or at a future time."
Many Utah cases have consider.ed the foregoing statutory provision, and each case has consistently held a preexisting indebtedness is a valuable consideration. In the
case of Helper State Bank vs. Jackson, 48 Utah 430, 160
Pac. 287, it was held that a note given in payment of a
discharge of a pre-existing debt was such consideration that
the payee was a holder for value. In Dern Inv.estment
Company vs. Carbon County Land Company, 94 Utah 76,
75 P2d, 660, a pre-existing debt was found sufficient consideration for a maker's obligation under a note. See also
Great American Indemnity Company vs. Berry~ssa, 122
Utah 243, 248 P2d 367.
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This court also considered the question in the case of
Ned J. Bowman vs. White, 369 P2d 962, 13 Utah 2d 173, in
which an action was filed by a judgment creditor to set
aside a debtor's mortgage to his father. It was held that
evidence supporting the finding that a note and mortgage
was made to secure a pre-existing obligation, and that the
release of the antecedent indebtedness was a valid consideration.
The matter of a pre-existing indebtedness as consideration i~ also extensively considered in an annotation in 39
A.L.R. 2d commencing at pag,e 1088. The annotation seeks
to determine the authorities on the question of whether an
antecedent debt amounts to "value" within the rule that one
who asserts it becomes a bona fide purchaser of property.
The annotation summarizes its review of authorities
throughout the United States by stating that a pre-existing
indebtedness is a good, valid consideration for a mortgage.
The annotation contains the following statement at page
1089:
"It would appear to be a matter of well-settled law that,
as a general principle, a mortgagee who, as consideration for the mortgage, has extended the time for payment of a pre-existing debt is a bona fide purchaser,
entitled to priority as such."

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellants agl'\eed
in a written contract to the priority granted to the mortgage of Mary J. Abraham and also to the amount of that
mortgage. Further, the mortgag.e of Mary J. Abraham was
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granted for good and valuable consideration, and the trial
of the court was correct in its determination of the matter.
We submit the decision of the trial court should be
sustained.

OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for Respondents
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah
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